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I.

INTRODUCTION

In music, a fugue is a composition based on a theme that is
stated at the beginning of a piece by one voice, taken up by a second voice or voices, and reappears throughout the piece at various
places in one or another of these voices.1 This Article will examine
some current legal developments in central banking in much the
same way as a musical fugue operates. Several different developing
areas of the law, apparently distinct and unrelated, will be tied together through a. common recurring theme. The areas to be examined are: (i) the emerging law of standby letters of credit; (ii)
the plea of sovereign immunity as it relates to a central bank; (iii)
some implications of certain bank failures and expropriations; and
(iv) the application of article VIII section 2(b) of the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. The theme that
recurs throughout these subjects is the letter of credit.
II.

THE EMERGING LAW OF STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT

A Brief Retrospective on the Letter of Credit
A letter of credit (or "credit") is an undertaking made by a
bank, at the request of a customer, to honor drafts drawn by the
beneficiary of the credit in accordance with the conditions speci*This Article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Central Banking Seminar
held at the International Monetary Fund from August 22 to September 1, 1983. The views
expressed in this Article are those of the writer and do not necessarily express the views of
the International Monetary Fund.
**Assistant General Counsel (Legislation), International Monetary Fund. A.B., Harvard
University (1954); LL.B., Harvard University (1957); LL.M., Georgetown University Law
Center (1965); member of the bars of the State of New York and the District of Columbia.
See W. APFL & R. DANIEL, HARvARD BPR DICTIONARY OF MUSIC 114 (1960).

622

GA. J. INT'L &

COMP.

L.

[Vol. 13:621

fled by it.' There are always at least three parties to a letter of
credit. The issuer is the bank opening the credit. The customer (or
account party) is the person who causes the issuer to open the
credit. The beneficiary is the person who is entitled to draw or demand payment under the credit. In some of the examples examined there may also be a second bank located in the country of
the beneficiary. This Article will consider two types of credits: the
commercial letter of credit and the standby letter of credit.
The Commercial Letter of Credit
Suppose that American Suits Company in Baltimore wants to
buy 300 bolts of woolen cloth from British Woolens Company in
London. American Suits does not want to send a bank draft with
its order without assurance that the cloth has been shipped. British Woolens is not familiar with the creditworthiness of American
Suits and does not want to risk nonpayment. In these circumstances, American Suits requests its bank, Baltimore National
Bank, to issue a letter of credit in favor of British Woolens. Upon
receipt of the credit, British Woolens has the assurance of the
credit-extending bank that if it presents the documents called for
in the letter of credit it will receive payment. Typically, these documents will include invoices, documents of insurance, and a bill of
lading issued by a carrier evidencing the shipment of the cloth and
conveying title to the goods in transit. In addition to the three parties already noted, a fourth party might figure in the transaction. If
British Woolens desires the added security of a bank's engagement
in England, it might require that the credit be confirmed by a
London bank. The scene is now set for British Woolens to ship the
goods and present the documents required under the credit together with its draft against Baltimore National (or the local bank
in London if the credit is a confirmed one). After assuring itself
that the documents presented accord with those specified by the
credit, the paying bank will charge the appropriate account. If
there are but three parties, then Baltimore National would charge
the account of its customer, American Suits. If the credit were confirmed, the London bank would charge the account of its correspondent, Baltimore National, and the latter would, in turn, charge
' See UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CRwrrs, General Provisions
and Definitions (b) (I.C.C. Pub. 290, 1974) [hereinafter cited as U.C.P.]; see also U.C.C. § 5103(1)(a) (1978).
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the account of American Suits.'
The Standby Letter of Credit
A very different set of circumstances invites the use of a standby
letter of credit in international financial transactions. Typically,
the circumstances involve foreign government procurement and
construction programs.
One area in which standby letters of credit have been used with
frequency is the Middle East. Suppose that a government agency
in Oman awards a procurement contract to Construction Company
in New York to install air conditioning equipment in government
buildings. As a condition of the contract, the Oman Government
requires the New York building contractor to secure a ninety day
warranty on the equipment with an amount equivalent to five per
cent of the contract price. Rather than setting aside a deposit of
actual funds in escrow, Construction Company may decide to request its bank in New York, Manhattan Trust, to issue in favor of
the government agency in Oman a standby letter of credit naming
the latter as beAeficiary. The terms of credit may permit the
agency to draw on it solely upon demand and without other explanation. It should be noted that, as in the case of the commercial
credit, the standby credit can also be set up with a fourth party. In
such a case, the standby letter of credit issued by the New York
bank might name a bank in Oman, rather than the agency itself, as
beneficiary. Oman Bank might then extend its guaranty to the
agency. This arrangement would be activated by a representation
made by the agency to Oman Bank and the latter's demand for
payment as beneficiary under the standby credit extended in its
favor by the Manhattan Trust.4
Documentary credit is defined as:
any arrangement, however named or described, whereby a bank (the issuing
bank), acting at the request and in accordance with the instructions of a customer
(the applicant for the credit), (i) is to make payment to or to the order of a third
party (the beneficiary), or (ii) authorises such payments to be made or such drafts
to be paid, accepted or negotiated by another bank, against stipulated documents,
provided that the terms and conditions of the credit are complied with.
U.C.P., supra note 2, General Provisions and Definitions (b).
I See Obligations Subject to Lending Limits, 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(a) (1983). A standby letter of credit is defined as:
any letter of credit, or similar arrangement however named or described, which
represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer (1) to repay
money borrowed by or advanced to or for the account of the account party or (2)
to make payment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the account
3

624

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 13:621

Differences Between Commercial and Standby Credits
At this point it is appropriate to consider the differences between the two types of credits. Four main differences may be
discerned:
(a) While all parties to the commercial credit expect that the
beneficiary will draw upon it in the ordinary course of the transaction, the parties to a standby credit do not expect that the beneficiary will draw under it unless a problem arises between the parties as a consequence of some non-performance.
(b) While commercial credits may be "clean," i.e. require no documents, in the transactions considered thus far involving the international transportation of goods, a documentary credit is usually
involved. Under such a credit, third party documents such as a bill
of lading are required. In contrast, the provisions of a typical
standby credit require only a declaration by the beneficiary that
the account party has failed to perform.
(c) Assuming the use of a documentary commercial credit and a
clean standby credit, an important difference arises in the security
available to the opening bank. Under a commercial credit, the documents of title to the shipment of goods (and the goods that they
represent) constitute security to the obligation of the bank to make
payment. Under a standby credit, however, there is no such
security.
(d) While the customs and law that govern the commercial
credit have been carefully developed and clarified over the de-

party, or (3) to make payment on account of any default by the account party in
the performance of an obligation.
Id. See also Comptroller's Interpretative Ruling, 12 C.F.R. §7.7016 (1983), which sets out
further guidelines for banks:
As a 'matter of sound banking practice, letters of credit should be issued in conformity with the following: (a) each letter of credit should conspicuously state that
it is a letter of credit or be conspicuously entitled as such; (b) the bank's undertaking should contain a specified expiration date or be for a definite term; (c) the
bank's undertaking should be limited in amount; (d) the bank's obligation to pay
should arise only upon the presentation of a draft or other documents as specified
in the letter of credit, and the bank must not be called upon to determine questions of fact or law at issue between the account party and the beneficiary; (e) the

bank's customer should have an unqualified obligation to reimburse the bank for
payments made under the letter of credit.
Id. The growth of standby letters of credit issued by United States bank holding companies
has been substantial. "The total amount of standby letters of credit ... grew 33.7% at the
top 10 holding companies during 1981 to $42.1 billion. At yearend, this sum was equal to
7% of the banks' total assets and 181% of their combined shareholders' equity." Norton,
Standby Letters: An Off-Balance-Sheet Boom, THE AMERuCAN BANKER, June 24, 1982, at 1.
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cades, no such body of rules and decisions characterizes the practice surrounding the use of the standby credit, a relative
newcomer.
It is the last of these differences that is focused upon here.
Bankers and courts throughout the world are familiar with the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (U.C.P.),
a set of rules developed under the aegis of the International Chamber of Commerce. These rules are almost universally accepted as
governing traditional commercial credits. Supplemented by national law, which in some cases expressly defers to them, 5 the rules
and the law together form a reliable conceptual framework for the
commercial credit based on documents. By contrast, there is no
such body of law and practice that gives agreed structure to transactions involving standby credits. Private parties, bankers, and
governments are attempting to sketch out these rules.6 In this aura
of newness and development, it is not surprising that despite the
substantial differences between the two instruments, courts are
turning to the familiar precedents of the commercial credit in order to help resolve the problems posed by the standby credit.
Before examining the key cases in the developing area of the
standby credit, American Bell International,Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran7 and Itek Corp. v. First National Bank of Boston,8
consider some of the rules that are currently believed to be applicable to both types of credits.9
Rules Applicable to Both Commercial and Standby Credits:
Separation of Contracts and the Duty of the Bank to Pay
It is generally recognized that both kinds of letters of credit can
be broken, for purposes of analysis, into their component arrangements. In the basic case which involves three parties, three separate agreements may be distinguished:
'

See, e.g., N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1964).
' In a proposed revision of the U.C.P., supra note 2, it is expressly stated that standby
credits are to be governed, where applicable, by the U.C.P. See Kozolchyk, The Emerging
Law of Standby Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees, 24 ARIz. L. Rav. 319, 346 (1982).
474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
511 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Mass. 1981), vacated, 704 F.2d 1 (1983).
* It should be noted that the proposed revision of the U.C.P. which would apply to both
standby and commercial credits has been criticized. One observer has stated that "standby
letters of credit are such a different institution from ordinary documentary credits that I
consider it unwise and potentially leading to confusion that the new U.C.P. should extend to
this type of financial facility." Schmitthoff, The New Uniform Customs for Letters of
Credit, J. Bus. L., May 1983, at 193, 195 (1983).

626

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 13:621

(a) the agreement between the account party (American Suits in
the commercial credit example; Construction Company in the
standby credit example) and the beneficiary (British Woolens in
the commercial credit example; Government Agency in the
standby credit example). This is evidenced by the underlying contract of sale.
(b) the agreement between the issuing bank (Baltimore National
Bank in the commercial credit example; Manhattan Trust in the
standby credit example) and the beneficiary (British Woolens in
the commercial credit example; the government agency in the
standby credit example). This is the letter of credit.
(c) the agreement between the account party (American Suits in
the commercial credit example; Construction Company in the
standby credit example) and the issuing bank (Baltimore National
Bank in the commercial credit example; Manhattan Trust in the
standby credit example). This is ordinarily in the form of an application for a credit.
In accordance with this analysis, each contract is separate from
the others. Thus, the letter of credit is independent of the underlying contract between the account party and the beneficiary. 10 It
follows that the issuing bank's obligation does not include liability
or responsibility for performance of the underlying contract for
sale between the account party and the beneficiary."
A bank's duty is limited to inspection of the documents and does
not include concern with the goods. 12 According to article 7 of the
U.C.P., it must examine all documents with reasonable care to as10 U.C.C. § 5-114 comment 1 (1978).
1 U.C.C. § 5-109(1)(a) (1978). The principle is expressed in U.C.C. §5-114(1).(1978):
An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the
terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents conform
to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer and the
beneficiary.
Id. Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the U.C.P., supra note 2, clarify that a bank opening a letter of
credit assumes no liability for a host of items that may go wrong. Thus article 9 provides:
Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents, or for the general and/or
particular conditions stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon; nor do
they assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight,
quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods represented
thereby, or for the good faith or acts and/or omission, solvency, performance or
standing of the consignor, the carriers or the insurers of the goods or any other
person whomsoever.

Id.
is U.C.P., supra note 2, art. 9.
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certain that on their face they appear to be in accord with the
terms of the credit.'" If they appear on their face to be inconsistent
with one another, they will be considered as not appearing on their
face to be in accordance with the terms of the credit.1 4 They
should conform precisely. A more difficult question is posed by
documents which appear on their face to comply but which, in
fact, are forged, fraudulent, or part of a transaction involving
fraud.
Exception to the Bank's Duty to Pay Under a Commercial
Credit: Claim of Fraud
This issue was posed in the landmark case of Sztejn v. J. Henry
5 In Sztejn, the plaintiff had conSchroder Banking Corporation."
tracted to buy a quantity of bristles from Transea. Traders in
Lucknow, India and had caused its bank, J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, to issue an irrevocable commercial letter of credit
in favor of the sellers. Transea had then placed fifty cases on board
a ship and procured both a bill of lading from the steamship company and the customary invoices describing the bristles called for
by the letter of credit. Transea then drew a draft under the letter
of credit and presented it for collection, together with the documents called for by the credit, to the defendant bank in India. The
complaint alleged that, instead of shipping bristles, Transea had
filled the cases with cowhair and rubbish with intent to simulate
genuine merchandise in order to defraud the plaintiff and that the
documents presented with the draft for payment were accordingly
fraudulent. 6
In granting the plaintiff's request for an injunction to restrain
the presentment to and payment by the defendant issuing bank of
the drafts, the Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,
gave heed to the principle of the independence of contracts and to
its corollary that in undertaking an obligation to honor a draft
drawn in accordance with the terms of a commercial letter of
credit, a bank deals in documents, not goods.17
" See also U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1978).
U.C.P., supra note 2, art. 7.

14

15 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1941).
16Id. at 633.
' The court stated that:
[i]t
is well established that a letter of credit is independent of the primary con-

tract of sale between the buyer and the seller. The issuing bank agrees to pay
upon presentation of documents, not goods. This rule is necessary to preserve the
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However, the court qualified these principles in a situation in
which there was intentional fraud. The court held that where the
seller intentionally fails to ship the goods purchased by the buyer
and this failure is brought to the attention of the bank before the
drafts and documents have been presented for payment, the principle of the independence of the bank's obligation should not be
allowed to protect the actions of a fraudulent seller."8
The decision of the court was codified in section 5-114 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).' 9 The significance and authority of the case have carried forward from the well-established field
of commercial credits to the developing field of standby credits.

efficiency of the letter of credit as an instrument for the financing of trade. One of
the chief purposes of the letter of credit is to furnish the seller with a ready means
of obtaining prompt payment for his merchandise. It would be a most unfortunate
interference with business transactions if a bank before honoring drafts drawn
upon it was obliged or even allowed to go behind the documents, at the request of
the buyer and enter into controversies between the buyer and the seller regarding
the quality of merchandise shipped ...
Id.
10 The court stated that:

[tihis is not a controversy between the buyer and seller concerning a mere breach
of warranty regarding the quality of the merchandise; on the present motion, it
must be assumed that the seller has intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered
by the buyer. In such a situation, where the seller's fraud has been called to the
bank's attention before the drafts and documents have been presented for payment, the principle of the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter
of credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller.
Id. at 634. The court went on to quote with approval another case stating that "when the
issuer of a letter of credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in point of
fact, false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognize such a document as complying
with the terms of a letter of credit." Id. at 635.
U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1978) provides:
Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply with the
terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 7-507) or of a
certificated security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in
the transaction:
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded
by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand which has taken the
draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances which would make it a
holder in due course (Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a
person to whom a document of title has been duly negotiatied (Section 7-502) or a
bona fide purchaser of a certificated security (Section 8-302); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may
honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the customer of
fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a
court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor.
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Exception to the Bank's Duty to Pay Under a Standby Credit:
Claim of Fraud
The change of governments in Iran following the revolution in
that country in 1978 and 1979 posed a severe challenge to the integrity of the standby letter of credit in international trade. The
relatively new instrument had acquired widespread acceptance and
was being used with frequency in trade with the Middle East.
These credits involved many millions of dollars. It was standard
practice for United States contracting concerns to cause their
banks to open irrevocable standby letters of credit incident to their
performance of the contracts with Iranian government agencies.
Following the Iranian revolution, with the status of the underlying
contracts in doubt, many of the United States contractors sought
to enjoin the issuing banks from honoring demands for payment
under the standby credits on the ground of fraud. The issuing
banks resisted, arguing that such a development would jeopardize
the utility of the new instrument and cast doubt on the reliability
of United States financial arrangements in international trade. The
first case to come to adjudication was American Bell Interna2
tional, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran.
In American Bell, the plaintiff, Bell, had entered into a contract
with the Ministry of War of the Imperial Government of Iran to
provide consulting services and equipment for its communications
system. The Imperial Government paid Bell a downpayment on
the purchase price but required Bell to obtain from an Iranian
bank, Bank Iranshahr, an unconditional and irrevocable guaranty
in favor of the Imperial Government. In turn, Bank Iranshahr required Bell to obtain a standby letter of credit from its bank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, in favor of Bank Iranshahr in the
amount of the downpayment. The purpose of this standby credit
was to secure reimbursement to Bank Iranshahr in the event that
it was required to pay the Imperial Government under its guaranty. Bell commenced work under the contract, but in the wake of
the revolution, with unpaid invoices and claims, ceased performance in early 1979. When Manufacturers Hanover Trust notified
Bell that it had received a conforming demand under the standby
credit to make payment to Bank Iranshahr, Bell sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the making of such payment.2 1
20 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

11 Id. at 422.
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The United States district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. It found that the plaintiff had failed to meet the
criteria required before a preliminary injunction may be granted. 2
The court held that Bell had failed to show that there were sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that would tip decisively in the plaintiffs favor if the case
were litigated. Bell would lose the amount of the downpayment
upon the honoring by Manufacturers Hanover Trust of the draft
drawn under the standby; however, the court reasoned that if
Manufacturers Hanover Trust refused to pay, Bank Iranshahr
could sue on the letter of credit and attach the former's assets in
Iran. Moreover, such refusal would lead to substantial adverse consequences in the international banking community since Manufacturers Hanover Trust would face a loss of credibility from its fail23
ure to make good on a letter of credit.
The court also ruled that Bell failed to demonstrate that litigation, if pursued, would result in probable success on the merits in
its favor. In order to achieve such success, Bell would have to show
either that a demand for payment conforming to the letter of
credit had not been made or that even if a demand had been made,
it should not be honored because of fraud in the transaction. The
court found it less than probable that nonconformity with the
terms of the credit could be proved.24
Bell did not contend that any of the documents were fraudulent
as a result of misstatements or omissions. It argued that there was
"fraud in the transaction. 2'5 This, Bell claimed, derived from the
totality of the circumstances. The court, however, found no real
evidence of fraud since Iran had the right to repudiate the contract
and pay damages. 6
n

Id. at 426.

" Id.
Id. at 423. The court went on to note that[i]f conformity is established, as here, the issuer of an irrevocable, unconditional
letter of credit, such as Manufacturers, normally has an absolute duty to transfer
the requisite funds. This duty is wholly independent of the underlying contractual
relationship that gives rise to the letter of credit. Shanghai Commercial Bank,
Ltd. v.Bank of Boston Int'l, 53 A.D.2d 830, 385 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1st dep't 1976).
Nevertheless, both the Uniform Commercial Code of New York, which the parties
concede governs here, and the courts state that payment is enjoinable where a
germane document is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction.
474 F. Supp. at 424.
" Id.
Id. at 425. The court stated that:
[a]bsent any showing that Iran would refuse to pay damages upon a contract ac-
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Finally, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to show
that, absent the grant of the injunction, it would suffer irreparable
injury. While the evidence warranted a conclusion that resort by
Bell to the Iranian courts would not likely meet with success, Bell
had not demonstrated that it was without appropriate remedy
under the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.27
As the relations between Iran and the United States deteriorated, the view of both the United States Government and United
States courts changed. Following the taking of hostages in the
United States Embassy in Teheran in November 1979, President
Carter issued Executive Order No. 12170. This executive order, issued under the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, blocked all property and interest therein of the
Government of Iran and authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
to implement the blocking order.2" The Secretary, in turn, issued
what became known as the Iranian Assets Control Regulations,
which prohibited the unauthorized transfer of property in which
Iran had an interest.29 This included transfers in connection with
standby letters of credit. While these Regulations barred the entry
of any final judgment that affected blocked assets, they did not bar
certain other judicial proceedings. Furthermore, they authorized a
procedure to forestall the payment of standby credits for which requests were received from Iranian beneficiaries. Pursuant to this
procedure, a bank that received a demand for payment from an
Iranian beneficiary was required to notify the account party. The
latter might then apply for a specific license from the Treasury to
open a blocked account on its books in the name of the Iranian
beneficiary. This procedure could thus avoid the payment by the
bank into a blocked account of its own with consequential reimtion here or in Iran, much less a showing that Bell has even attempted to obtain
such a remedy, the evidence is ambivalent as to whether the purported repudiation results from non-fraudulent economic calculation or from fraudulent intent to
mulct Bell.

Id.
" See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). See generally Getz,
Enjoining the InternationalStandby Letter of Credit: The IranianLetter of Credit Cases,
21 HA'v. INT'L L.J. 189 (1980); Driscoll, The Role of Standby Letters of Credit in International Commerce: Reflections After Iran, 20 VA. J. INT'. L. 458 (1980); Harfield, Enjoining
Letter of Credit Transactions,95 BANKING L.J. 596 (1978); Weisz and Blackman, Standby
Letters of Credit After Iran: Remedies of the Account Party, U. ILL. L. REv. 355 (1982).
"850 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1981).
" Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.568 (1982).
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bursement by the account party."0
Amid the changing political environment and the issuance of the
Iranian Assets Control Regulations, Itek Corp. v. First National
Bank of Boston was litigated. The case arose out of demands
made on three standby credits issued for Itek by First National
Bank in favor of Bank Melli in Iran, the beneficiary.
Itek had. contracted with the Imperial Government of Iran in
1977 to manufacture special optical equipment for the contract
price of $22,500,000. The contract obligated Itek to furnish bank
guarantees issued by an Iranian bank to the Imperial Government.
Itek obtained these from Bank Melli. In turn, Bank Melli required
Itek to procure in its favor letters of credit issued by Itek's United
States bank, First National Bank. Work proceeded in 1979, and in
April of that year, the United States Department of State cancelled Itek's export license.32
The underlying contract stated that in case of force majeure the
contract could be cancelled and the bank guarantees would be released. Cancellation of Itek's export license was one of the occurrences listed in the contract that could give rise to the declaration
of force majeure. When the United States Department of State
cancelled its export license, Itek had performed almost $20,000,000
of the work contemplated under the contract, but had received
payment of only $11,000,000. Under these circumstances, in accordance with the contract, Itek first attempted to settle accounts
with the Iranian Ministry of War and then followed contractual
procedures leading to cancellation of the contract for force
majeure, as well as to the release of the bank guarantees. s
Itek also obtained a temporary restraining order from the court
preventing First National Bank from honoring any demand for
payment on the credits issued in favor of Bank Melli without giving Itek at least three days notice. Thereafter, Bank Melli sent
First National Bank two telexes requesting extension of the outstanding letters of credit or, alternatively, immediate payment
under them. The court entered a temporary restraining order, and
Itek subsequently sought and obtained a preliminary injunction
which enjoined payment by First National Bank under the

See id.
511 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Mass. 1981), affirmed and modified in Civil Action No. 80-58MA, slip op. (May 25, 1982), vacated, 704 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
0 511 F. Supp. at 1342-43.
" Id. at 1343-44.
"
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credits.84
Itek's success ended when it sought to convert the preliminary
injunction into a permanent injunction against payment under the
standby credits and to obtain a final judgment in the case. In support of these goals, Itek charged that Bank Melli's demand for
payment under the letters of credit did not conform to their terms

and that there was fraud in the transaction within the meaning of
section 5-114 of the U.C.C."
The district court found in favor of Itek that Bank Melli's
telexed demands for payment were nonconforming in that they
failed to certify the amount that First National Bank had to pay to
the Ministry of War and thereby omitted an essential term. The
district court stated that in these circumstances it was being asked
to allow First National "to honor a draft on a letter of credit on
the basis of a foreign bank's overbroad statements of its liabilities
to a beneficiary where both beneficiary and bank are controlled by
a single government." 36 Moreover, the court found that the letters
of credit had expired before a required signed statement from
87
Bank Melli had arrived.

The district court also found in favor of Itek on the ground that
there was fraud in the transaction. In the view of the court there
existed a clear case of fraud under U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b), which au-

thorizes a court of "appropriate jurisdiction" to enjoin honoring a
letter of credit where there existed fraud in the transaction. The
district court found that the Bank Melli's refusal to credit Itek's
account with the amount owed and its attempt to recover an additional sum of $3,5000,000 constituted fraud."
In accordance with its findings, the district court entered summary judgment against First National Bank and Bank Melli and
issued a permanent injunction enjoining the former from honoring
any demand for payment under the letters of credit.3 9 The permanence of this injunction, however, was soon called into question.
On January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran had reached
agreement on the release of the Americans that had been taken
hostage in Teheran. In accordance with this agreement, the United
" Id. at 1344.
Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, Civil Action No. 80-58-MA, slip op. at 1
(1982).
" Id. at 4.
'1 Id.
at 4-5.
Id. at 5-6.
"Id. at 6-7.
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States agreed to return to Iran financial assets that had been
blocked and to submit claims of United States and Iranian nationals against each others' governments to an International Arbitral
Tribunal. The United States also agreed to terminate litigation in
United States courts concerning claims that were subject to arbitration in accordance with the agreement.40
Whatever the status of other claims under the agreement, all was
not settled with respect to standby letters of credit. This became
clear as the stage was reached for implementation. While a new
executive order41 was issued by President Reagan which suspended
in United States courts "[aill claims which may be presented to
the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal," the order expressly exempted "any claims concerning the validity or payment of a
standby letter of credit.

' 42

This exemption was also reflected in

amendments to the Iranian Assets Control Regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Treasury.4" At the same time these amendments removed the bar against final judgments in such cases.
Under these circumstances the district court handed down its
final judgment and permanent injunction in the Itek case. 4 5 Before
a month had elapsed following the entry of judgment in Itek, however, the Treasury Department amended the Regulations on July
2, 1982 to clarify that the relevant provision does not authorize any
final judgment which seeks to permanently enjoin, terminate, or
otherwise dispose of any Iranian interest in any standby letter of
credit or similar obligation."6
Moreover, the United States Government filed a Statement of
Interest with the district court in which it sought to persuade the
court that this amendment should apply to judgments handed
down before it was issued if such judgments were not final in the
0 See U.S. Authorization to Approve Text of Documents relating to the Release of the

Hostages, Jan. 18, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 223.
4

Exec. Order No. 12,294, 14 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 app.

at 872 (Supp. 1982).
42 Id.
,s Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.222 (1982).
See id. §§ 535.504, 535.508.
Is Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, Civil Action No. 80-58-MA, slip op. at 6-7.
46 The amended regulation states that it does not authorize "any final judicial judgment
or order (A) permanently enjoining, (B) terminating or nullifying, or (C) otherwise permanently disposing of any interest of Iran in any standby letter of credit, performance bond or
similar obligation. Any license authorizing such action is hereby revoked and withdrawn."
Amendments to Iranian Assets Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,528 (1981) (to be codified at 31

C.F.R. § 535.504 (b)(3)(i)).
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sense that they were still subject to appeal. To bolster this position, the Treasury Department once again amended the Regulations to incorporate this view into the relevant provision.",
By way of explanation, the Treasury Department stated that
while the Regulations are intended to permit United States account parties to obtain preliminary injunctions or other temporary
relief against payment under standby credits, "any judgment or
court order which finally extinguishes Iran's interest in a standby
letter of credit or similar obligation is prohibited, including any
such judgment or order which was entered prior to July 2, 1982,
but which was subject to appellate proceedings as of that date,
such as the judgment in the case of Itek v. First National Bank of
Boston."48
Armed with the amended Regulation, First National Bank and
Bank Melli appealed from the district court decision. In light of
the amended provisions, the appellants sought to vacate the judgment which purported to be final and the order for a permanent
injunction. Itek countered by contesting, among other things, the
validity of the amendments to the Regulation. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the position advocated by the appellants (and the United States Government). 9
In the course of its decision, the court held that while the judgment below was rightfully rendered, the subsequent Regulations
had made the decision no longer appropriate. The court further
refused to address the lower court's finding of the existence of
fraud and left the district court free to impose other permissible
relief, such as a preliminary injunction.50
Thus the matter rests, at least for the present. While the United

4 The amended regulation states:
(b) This section does not authorize:
(3)(i) Any final judicial judgment or order (A) permanently enjoining, (B) terminating or nulifying, or (C) otherwise permanently disposing of any interest of Iran
in any standby letter of credit, performance bond or similar obligation. Any license authorizing such action is hereby revoked and withdrawn. This revocation
and withdrawal of licenses prohibits judgments or orders that are within the terms
of this subparagraph (3)(i), including any such judgments or orders which may
have been previously entered but which had not become final by July 2, 1982,
through the conclusion of appellate proceedings or the expiration of the time for
appeal.
Amendments to Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 55,481 (1982) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 535.504 (b)(3)(i)).
48 Id.
"' Itek v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 511 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 11.
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States maintains its position that the agreement with Iran does not
require arbitration before the Claims Tribunal of controversies
that arise out of standby credits, it has instituted a temporary bar
to final judgments in its courts pending the settlement of this
question.5
Where does this leave the question of whether fraud sufficient to
support an injunction against payment under a standby credit can
derive from political controversy? Is a demand for payment under
a standby credit, if made primarily for political rather than economic reasons, a form of fraud in the transaction?5 2 When the initial clarity of American Bell is compared with the inconclusiveness
of the Itek litigation, one must conclude that the criteria are still
unsettled for testing fraud in the context of standby credits. The
bare recital of the facts by the district court in Itek (which on this
point appear not to differ appreciably from those in American
Bell) does little to advance matters." The court of appeals studiously avoided expressing an opinion on the substantive questions, applying to the case only the provisions of the amended Regulation.5 4 In this light there is ground for reflection on the
reservation that the United States has entered. The effect of this
reservation would preserve the resolution of controversies concerning standby credits to the national courts and remove these controversies (with the inevitable issue of politically motivated fraud)
from the consideration of the Claims Tribunal.
Why, of all claims, should standby letters of credit possibly be
exempt from the provisions of an international agreement? It has
been suggested that, on the one hand, the United States Government is attempting to balance its right to regulate matters within
its own jurisdiction while simultaneously protecting its treaty obli11The United States Treasury Department noted when extending the time period of this
bar that:
Iran has filed with the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 229 claims based on
standby letters of credit or similar bank instruments. On December 1, 1982, the
United States filed with the Tribunal a request that the Tribunal determine
which, if any, of these claims come within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. On October
25, 1982, Iran filed with the Tribunal an allegation that the United States has
violated its obligations under the Algiers Accords by failing to transfer to Iran the
amounts of these standby letters of credit. The Tribunal may rule both on the
United States jurisdictional request and on the Iranian allegation as to United
States obligations under the Accords within the next year.
47 Fed. Reg. at 55,482.
" See Driscoll, supra note 27, at 484.
53 See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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gations which call for settlement of claims between Iran and the
United States. On the other hand, it is noted that the United
States 'Government does not wish to impede the ability of its nationals to prosecute and defend claims involving standby credits
which are often contradictory. 55 In this area United States citizens
are arranged on both sides of complex factual patterns and legal
relationships, often, as in American Bell and Itek, in the very same
cases.
III.

THE PLEA OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS IT RELATES TO A
CENTRAL BANK

Two Doctrines of Sovereign Immunity: Absolute and Restrictive
The international law concept of sovereign immunity gradually
has undergone a fundamental shift. This shift has been from the
classical doctrine of absolute immunity to a more restrictive theory. Traditionally, foreign sovereigns enjoyed an absolute immunity from both suit and execution on their assets: the sovereign
could not be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign
without his own consent. This absolute immunity derived from the
unqualified independence of every sovereign authority and from
the demands of international comity which require every sovereign
state to respect the dignity and independence of every other
state.5" The doctrine seemed fixed and unyielding in an era in
which sovereign states declined to engage in commercial activities.
Over the last seven decades, however, the nearly universal perception of the role of the sovereign state has changed. Almost
every state now engages in commercial activities in some form or
another, whether through direct action of a government department or through the creation of separate legal entities. Consequently, the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity first suffered
attack and then almost everywhere expired. The notion that private persons engaged in commerce with the sovereign would be
without a mode of effective redress should controversy develop between the parties concerning their respective obligations was basic
to the criticism. In the wake of an increasing number of such encounters, scholars, judges, and the public became convinced that if
inroads were not made on the doctrine, its unrestricted availability
" See Silverman and Ulmer, The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases: An InternationalImbroglio, 15 MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP. 196 (Nov. 1982).
" See The Parlement Beige, [1880] 5 P.D. 197, 214-15.
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would permit a government to switch back and forth from the role
of a trader to that of a sovereign depending upon which role best
served its interest at the moment. 7
Under the impetus of perceived inequity in the application of
the absolute doctrine, acceptance of the newer restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity grew rapidly. According to this theory, sovereign immunity is still recognized when the state is involved in public acts (jure imperii) but is no longer recognized in regard to private acts (jure gestionis). 8 Thus, if in the words of Lord Denning,
a dispute were to bring into question:
the legislative or international transactions of a foreign government, or the policy of its executive, the court should grant immunity if asked to do so, because it does offend the dignity of a foreign sovereign to have the merits of such a dispute canvassed in
the domestic courts of another country; but if the dispute concerns, for instance, the commercial transactions of a foreign government (whether carried on by its own departments or agencies
or by setting up separate entities), and it arises properly within
the territorial jurisdiction of our courts, there is no ground for
granting immunity."
Twenty years after this statement, which formed part of a call for
review of the theory of sovereign immunity so as to bring English
law into accord with that of the majority of states that had by this
time firmly established themselves within the camp of the restrictive theory, a case arose before Lord Denning which would prove
to be the last great contest between the two theories.
The Last Great Battle Between the Two Theories of Sovereign
Immunity
Trendtex Trading Corp., Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria arose
from extraordinary circumstances involving one of the most enormous commercial disputes in history. 60 The Nigerian Government,
61 The unrestricted availability of sovereign immunity would in the words of one judge:
authorize a sovereign prince to assume the character of a trader, when it is for his
benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a private subject to throw off... his
disguise, and appear as a sovereign, claiming for his own benefit, and to the injury
of a private person, for the first time, all the attributes of his character.
The Charkiel, [1873] 4 L.R.-Adm. & Eccl. 59, 100.
" Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments (Tate Letters), 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
" Rubintoola v. Nizam of Hyderbed, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884, 913, 3 All E.R. 441, 463.
" Trendtex Trading Corp., Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881; see

1983]

LEGAL MATTERS AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS

engaged in an ambitious program of development, had obligated
itself to buy a vast quantity of cement which was crucial to the
construction of its infrastructure. It had executed 109 contracts
with 68 suppliers for over 16 million metric tons at a price approaching one billion dollars. As it turned out, however, the government had overbought. In July 1975, the ports of Lagos and
Apapa were congested with shipping. The docks were completely
filled, and ships were waiting to discharge their cargoes. It is estimated that there were between 300 and 400 ships waiting to unload; more vessels with cement were on the way. At this point a
new government took power and immediately tried to solve the
problem. It issued a notice suspending the shipment of cement to
Nigeria. It then directed the Central Bank of Nigeria to telex its
correspondent banks abroad to withhold payment in respect of letters of credit opened by the Central Bank in favor of the sellers of
the cement unless, in addition to the documents required by the
letters of credit, they were in receipt of Nigerian Government
clearance certificates authorizing the shipments.6 1
Trendtex, the plaintiff, was the beneficiary of a commercial letter of credit issued by the Central Bank and advised through its
London correspondent Midland Bank. The latter acted only as
agent in the transaction and was not asked to confirm the irrevocable commercial credit of the Central Bank. The credit was made
expressly subject to the provisions of the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits and was in respect of a contract
entered into by the Ministry of Defense for the purchase of
cement. 6'
When Trendtex presented the documents called for by the credit
together with sight drafts to Midland Bank, the bank, under instructions from its principal the Central Bank of Nigeria, refused
to make payment. The plaintiff then brought suit for damages
against Central Bank arising from the failure of the issuing bank to
authorize payment in accordance with the terms of the credit and
obtained an injunction ordering the defendant to retain within the
court's jurisdiction a sum of money sufficient to meet the plaintiff's
claim. 63

also Texas
[1977]
Id. at
Id. at

Trading v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 1982).
1 All E.R. at 885-87.
885-86.
886-87.
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The Court of Appeal" applied the absolute doctrine of sovereign
immunity and held for the Central Bank. It ordered the discharge
of the injunction. The Court reasoned that simply because the
Central Bank had been established as a legal entity and was not
characterized in its enabling law as a government department, this
did not preclude it from being considered a part of the machinery
of government if its principal functions were essential functions of
the state which were not provided by another body.65 After an exhaustive analysis of the functions of the Central Bank, the Court
concluded that the Central Bank was indeed an extension of the
Nigerian Government. The Court based this decision upon such
factors as the prime functions of the Central Bank, currency control and treasury activity, which are essentially state activities."
The Court recognized that the Central Bank had some discretion
in deciding how to conduct its affairs but concluded that the discretion was exercised on behalf of the interest of the state and not
6
of the Central Bank. 7
On further appeal, the decision was reversed and the injunction
reinstated."' The common ground of all three judges was that the
defendant had not established that it was a department or organ of
Nigeria and, therefore, it was not entitled to the plea of sovereign
immunity in respect of the suit." To this extent the doctrine of
absolute immunity was employed, but the Court found the evidence insufficient to satisfy its requirements.7 0
A secondary ground on which two of the judges agreed was that
even if it had been established that the defendant was a department or organ of the state, it could not plead sovereign immunity
with respect to an ordinary commercial transaction.71 This ground
rests on the recognition of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. All three judges agreed that the issue of the immunity of
the funds from seizure depended upon the immunity or lack
thereof of the defendant. 2
In deciding that the plea of sovereign immunity would no longer

Trendtex Trading Corp., Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [19761 3 All E.R. 437.
6 Id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
Ild.
' Trendtex, [1977] 1 All E.R. at 881.
"

Id.

70

Id. at 907.

7'

Id. at 892, 908.

71

Id.

at 895, 905, 911.
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be accorded to ordinary trading transactions and that the restrictive doctrine of immunity should be applied to actions in personam 7 the Court had dealt the absolute theory a lethal blow.
Lord Denning, who earlier had questioned the absolute theory,
now explained his support for the restrictive theory. Reflecting on
the activities of modern sovereign states, he said:
They charter ships. They buy commodities. They issue letters of
credit. This transformation has changed the rules of international
law relating to sovereign immunity ....

[The doctrine of restric-

tive immunity] gives immunity to acts of a governmental nature
...but no immunity to acts of a commercial nature. .... 74
Lord Denning concluded that regardless of the ultimate purpose of
the transaction, it was the nature of the transaction that was critical. 5 Therefore, the fact that the Nigerian Government wished to
use the cement for a government purpose was irrelevant. What was
crucial was that it had chosen to enter the market place. 6
The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity:
Kingdom

United

In the year following the Trendtex decision, the United Kingdom enacted the State Immunity Act of 197877 based on the Euro-

pean Convention on State Immunity

8

and incorporating the re-

7$ Immunity was refused in actions in rem against state-owned ships carrying on commer-

cial activities in Phillippine Admiral v. Willem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd., [1976] 1 All
E.R. 78.
7, Trendtex, [1977] 1 All E.R. at 890.
76

Id. at 893. Lord Denning stated:
It was suggested that the original contracts for cement were made by the Ministry
of Defense of Nigeria, and that the cement was for the building of barracks for the
army. On this account it was said that the contracts of purchase were acts of a
governmental nature-jure imperii-and not of a commercial nature-jure gastionis. They were like a contract of purchase of boots for the army. But I do not
think this should affect the question of immunity. If a government department
goes into the market places of the world and buys boots or cement-as a commercial transaction-that government department should be subject to all the rules of
the market place. The seller is not concerned with the purpose to which the purchaser intends to put the goods.

Id.
76 Id.

"' An Act to make new provision with respect to proceedings in the United Kingdom; by
or against other states; to provide for the effect of judgments given against the United Kingdom in the courts of state parties to the European Convention on State Immunity; to make
new provision with respect to the communities and privileges of the Heads of State; and for
connected purposes [State Immunity Act], 1978, ch. 33.
" European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol, May 16, 1982,
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strictive theory of sovereign immunity. The Act distinguishes
between immunity from suit and immunity from attachment and
execution.
The formal structure of the Act provides that a foreign sovereign
state is immune from suit in the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United Kingdom except as it otherwise expressly provides. The
Act then sets out the circumstances in which a state is not immune. It is not immune if it submits to the jurisdiction of the
courts. If the state has not submitted to such jurisdiction but the
proceedings relate to a commercial transaction entered into by the
state then, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties, immunity will not attach.7 9 "Commercial" is defined in section 3(3)
as:
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance
and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation; and
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial,
industrial, financial, professional or other similar character) into
which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise than in the
exercise of sovereign authority .... 80
The Act further provides that a state is not immune from proceedings that relate to a contractual obligation of the state
(whether a commercial transaction or not) which is to be performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom. An exception is
made if the contract was made in the territory of the state concerned and if the obligation is governed by that state's administrative law.' Further circumstances in which a state is not immune
from legal proceedings are set out in sections 4 through 8 of the
Act. These circumstances are characterized by the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as acts not performed in the exercise of
sovereign authority. 8"
Despite this substantial turnabout in situations in which a state
may no longer plead immunity from suit in legal proceedings,

Europ. T.S. 74, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972). See Sinclair, The European Convention
on State Immunity, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 254 (1973).
79 State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3. The exceptions from immunity made by section
3 do not apply if the two parties to the dispute are states. Id. § 3(2).
" Id.
§ 3(3).
" Id. § 3(2).
*, See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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under the Act a state will be largely immune from the interlocutory relief of attachment and execution in aid of judgment unless
the state gives written consent. This consent will not be inferred
from a mere submission to the jurisdiction of the courts. Accordingly, section 13(2)(a) provides that relief will not be given by way
of an injunction, and section 13(2)(b) provides that "the property
of a state shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement of
a judgement or arbitration award or, in an action in rem, for its
arrest, detention or sale." 83 An exception, however, is made to the
last rule by section 13(4), which permits the issue of process respecting property that is "in use or intended for use for commercial purposes. ... ,s This exception is qualified when a central
bank is the party in question. The property of a central bank or
other monetary authority is immune from enforcement unless its
consent to such enforcement is obtained. Section 13(4) does not
apply to a central bank or other monetary authority since the
property of such bodies is not to be regarded as in such use or
intended to be used in that way. 85 The net effect is that central
banks and monetary authorities under the Act will have no immunity from suit in respect to commercial transactions, but they will
have full immunity from attachment or execution against their
property without their consent. It is irrelevant whether the bank or
authority is a separate entity from the state or is a government
agency.86
The Result if the Trendtex Case Had Arisen After the U.K. Act
The Central Bank would not have been immune from suit if the
case had arisen after the passage of the Act. It would not have
been immune from suit because section 3 of the Act reflects the
decision of the Court of Appeal in that case. 8 7 This conclusion follows whether or not the Central Bank is considered a separate entity from the Nigerian Government. If the Central Bank were con" State

Immunities Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 13(2)(b).

" Id. § 13(4).

S Id.

" The Act provides that it is not to be given retroactive effect. Accordingly, when suit
was brought against the Central Bank of Nigeria by another plaintiff in Hispano Americana
Mercantil S.A. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, based on the same facts the court held that as to
the injunction, as well as to sovereign immunity, the decision in Trendtex governed the case.
[1979] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 277, 279.
" See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text. See also Sinclair, Organs of the
State-Immunity of Organs of the State-Immunity Other than Diplomatic, 1980 Barr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 422, 429 (1980).
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sidered part of the government, it would not have immunity from
suit since the letter of credit would constitute a "commercial transaction" within the meaning of section 3(1)(a) and section 3(3).88 If,
on the other hand, the Central Bank were considered as a separate
entity from the government, it would not be immune from suit insofar as its protection from suit would then parallel that which
would be accorded to a state under the same circumstances.8 9
A different result would be obtained on the question of immunity from an injunction against removing assets from the jurisdiction of the Court.9 0 While the Court of Appeal in the Trendtex
case allowed an injunction to prevent the Central Bank from removing its assets from the jurisdiction, the State Immunity Act
grants to foreign monetary authorities and central banks absolute
protection from any form of attachment or execution.
The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity: FederalRepublic of Germany
In the Federal Republic of Germany, a case growing out of substantially the same facts as those litigated in Trendtex was decided
by the District Court of Frankfurt in December 1975. In that case,
9 1 the district
Nonresident Petitioner v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
court found it unnecessary to consider whether the Central Bank
could successfully assert sovereign immunity on the basis of being
bound by government instructions and of having to implement the
government's financial policies. Such an inquiry was unnecessary
because even if the Central Bank were an integral instrumentality
of the Nigerian Government, it could not claim immunity on the
facts of the case. The court applied the restrictive theory of immuU This same conclusion would be reached if it were considered under section 3(1)(b) as
"an obligation of the state which by virtue of a contract (whether a commercial transaction
or not) calls to be performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom." State Immunities
Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3(1)(b).
" Section 14(2) of the Act provides:
A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
Kingdom if, and only if (a) the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign
authority; and
(b) the circumstances are such that a State (or, in the case of proceedings to
which section 10 above applies, a State which is not a party to the Brussels Convention) would have been so immune.
State Immunities Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 14(2).
" See Sinclair, supra note 87, at 435. See also Marston, State Immunity-Recent U.K.
Developments, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 349, 353 (1979).
15 I.L.M. 501 (1977) (Federal Republic of Germany).

19831

LEGAL MATTERS AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS

645

nity, stating that a foreign state is exempt from the jurisdiction of
German courts only in regard to its governmental activities. In accordance with this theory, the court found that German law must
govern the characterization of the transaction in question. The test
was the nature of the transaction rather than its purpose. 2 On
that basis, the court rejected the defendant's contention that
Nigerian law would characterize the transaction differently (having
reference to the purchase of cement for construction of military
installations and the assumption of a payment obligation incident
thereto as a governmental activity).9" The decisive factor was that
a letter of credit had been issued and that the dispute turned on
the obligations of the defendant in accordance therewith.94
As for the question of the attachment of the local assets pending
disposition of the case on its merits, the court took the same position that the English Court of Appeal subsequently adopted in
Trendtex.95 The Frankfurt District Court decided that if jurisdiction over the foreign state exists, then attachment of the local assets of the foreign state is permissible. The court further held that
the only assets immune from attachment were those funds dedicated to public use at the time of the petition for attachment. 96
The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity: United States
The Central Bank of Nigeria was also sued in the United States
for its failure to carry out its obligations in accordance with irrevocable letters of credit issued by it and advised through the Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York. Payments were to be
made on the Central Bank's behalf by Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company upon presentation to Morgan of sight drafts and other
specified documents. When the United States company presented
11

Id. at 503.

13

The court stated:
pursuant to German law which governs the characterization, the execution of a
sales contract and payment thereunder by the Nigerian Ministry of Defense by
means of a letter of credit are not activities jure imperii in any sense of the
term ....
The respondent is, therefore, according to applicable German law, not
exempt from the jurisdiction of German courts.

Id. at 504.
" Id. at 503. The court held that "[pletitioner's claims do not arise from sovereign activities of the respondent but from the latter's private transactions, viz., the establishment of a
letter of credit at a bank." Id.
" This is no longer the rule in the United Kingdom as a result of the enactments of the
State Immunity Act. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3.
e 15 I.L.M. at 503.
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the drafts and other documents specified by the letters of credit,
Morgan, acting on the instructions of the Central Bank, refused
payment for cement deliveries and demurrage charges in the absence of additional documents (not called for by the letters of
credit) indicating that plaintiffs had given two months' advance
notice of the departure of ships transporting the cement and that
official clearance for such departures had been given. 7
As with cases brought in other countries, no United States court
granted the Central Bank of Nigeria immunity from the legal proceedings. In addition, the earlier cases which were decided under
the laws of New York held that the Central Bank's funds on deposit in New York banks were subject to attachment prior to judgment." As a consequence of the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 9 cases brought after the Act went
into force do not involve attachment proceedings.'
The United States Act is in many ways similar to the U.K. Act
because both are based on the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and because their structures are similar. Thus, the United
States Act provides that a state is immune from suit (in both state
and federal courts) except where specifically permitted. The
United States Act also is divided into provisions concerning immunity from legal proceedings and that from attachment and enforcement of judgments against the property of a foreign state.10 '
Under section 1605 of the Act exceptions from immunity are
made for a number of cases including, among others, those involving express or implied waivers and those involving the commercial
o See Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.
1981).
" See National American Corp. v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria and Central Bank of Nigeria, 448

F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Penn. 1978), affd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); National Bank and Trust
Company of North America, Ltd. v. J.L.M. International, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). See generally Nwogugu, Immunity of State Property-TheCentral Bank of Nigeria
in Foreign Courts, [1979] NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 179.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(4), 1441(d),
1602-1611 (1976). See generally Kahale and Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction:Toward a
Uniform Body of Law in Actions against Foreign States, 18 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211
(1979).
It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of section 1330(a) of the Act in a suit between a foreign plaintiff and a foreign sovereign
growing out of the cement controversy involving the Central Bank of Nigeria. See Verlinden
BV v. Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), reu'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
,os Attachment of assets of foreign states for jurisdictional purposes is now precluded. 28
U.S.C. § 1609.
,01 Id. §§ 1604-1605, 1609-1611.

1983]

LEGAL MATTERS AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS

activity of foreign states, provided that such activity has the necessary jurisdictional nexus with the United States.102
If the activity sued upon is "governmental" rather than "commercial," a foreign state is entitled to immunity from suit. Since
section 1605 depends on the interpretation of "commercial activity," the Act provides a definition of this term in subsection
1603(d):
(d) A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.
The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.'"3
In accordance with these parameters, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, considering four appeals from the
district court with facts substantially similar to those on which
Trendtex was decided, held in Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria and Central Bank of Nigeria' 4 that
jurisdiction existed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
and that the defendants had sufficient contacts with the United
States to allow the suit on the basis of personal jurisdiction. 0 5 The
court noted that despite article 3 of the Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits, providing that irrevocable letters of credit cannot be modified or cancelled without the consent
of all interested parties, the defendants had attempted a unilateral
alteration of the letters of credit. The letters of credit as well as
the cement contracts constituted "commercial activity" within the
meaning of the Act and hence the defense of sovereign immunity
was denied.1 06
Id. §1605. This section states in part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case -

1o2

(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States.
Id.
103
104

§ 1603(b).
647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 313-15.
Id. at 310.
Id.
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Although the court in Texas Trading did not consider the possibility of an attachment of the Central Bank's property to aid execution upon the judgment, a few words may be in order concerning
the treatment by the Act of the immunity from attachments.
The Act sets forth procedures governing service on and obtaining default judgment against a foreign state and its agencies or
instrumentalities. Attachments are precluded as a means of commencing a suit.10 7 The use of attachments in aid of execution or
from execution upon a judgment, however, is permitted in certain
circumstances under section 1610 of the Act. Section 1610(a)(2)
denies immunity from attachment in aid of execution or execution
upon a judgment against property used by a foreign state for a
commercial activity in the United States if the claim upon which
the judgment was based grew out of that activity. 0 8 Section
1610(b)(2) denies such immunity to the property of an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in
the United States if the judgment relates to a claim involving commercial activity carried on in the United States (or in certain circumstances elsewhere). 0 9 These provisions in section 1610 are restricted by section 1611 which specifically grants immunity from
attachment to central bank funds of foreign countries. Under section 1611 such funds are immune unless such immunity is explicitly waived by the bank or its parent government." 0
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN BANK FAILURES AND
EXPROPRIATIONS

An Ominous Series of Failures
A series of failures experienced a few years ago by well known
banks has generated concern in international banking circles. The
i01 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
108 Id.
§ 1610(a)(2).
'"
13

Id.
Id.

§ 1610(a)(2).
§ 1611(b)(1). This provision:

applies to funds of a foreign central bank or monetary authority which are deposited in the United States and 'held' for the bank's or authority's 'own account'
-i.e., funds used or held in connection with central banking activities, as distinguished from funds used solely to finance the commercial transactions of other
entities or of foreign states. If execution could be levied on such funds without an
explicit waiver, deposit of foreign funds in the United States might be discouraged. Moreover, execution against the reserves of foreign states could cause significant foreign relations problems.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6630.
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series includes the failures of Intra Bank in Beirut in 1966, United

States National Bank in San Diego in 1973, Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt of Cologne in 1974, and Franklin National Bank of New York
in the same year. In all these cases, the effects were contained despite the international component of some of the contributing
causes of the failures. There was no uncontrolled chain reaction
that might have brought down a number of banks in different
countries. Nevertheless, the failures of these banks and the
buildup of international sovereign debt have led bank regulatory
authorities in a number of countries to reassess the dangers in the
current situation."' Certain implications of this chain of failures,
implications of certain recent expropriations, and the responses of
the courts and of regulatory agencies will be considered.
It is difficult to attribute all of the cases of failure to any single
cause. Standby letters of credit were involved significantly in only
one case, that of the United States National Bank. However, they
also made their appearance in the failure of the New York branch
of Intra Bank.
On October 18, 1973, the United States Comptroller of the Currency declared the United States National Bank in San Diego insolvent. One important cause for the failure was found to be the
issuance by the bank of about $90 million in standby credits. Many
of these credits had been issued by the bank to cover loans extended by other banks to the bank's president."12 When these
other banks sought repayment from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Company (FDIC), which had been appointed receiver of the bank,
the FDIC refused, and suit was brought. While the district court
initially ruled in favor of the FDIC, the court of appeals ruled that
the equal treatment protection of creditors provisions of the National Bank Act required the FDIC to take account of the plaintiffs' claims." 3
The regulatory response to this failure was to require standby
credits to be included within the legal limitations which are applicable to lending to individual borrowers." 4 Bills that would further
"

See

STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS,

REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEBT, THE BANKS, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Comm. Print 1977).
Ill See Failureof the U.S. National Bank of San Diego: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see also Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Standby Letters of Credit:
Lessons from the USNB Failure, 53 TuL. L. REv. 314 (1979).
z First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 1978).
114 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 337.2, 7.1160, 208.8(d) (1983).
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limit the issuance of standby credits have been introduced in Congress but have not been passed into law. 115
In the earlier Intra Bank affair, letters of credit were involved
incidentally in connection with the circumstances surrounding the
closure of the New York branch. Intra Bank had been incorporated
in Lebanon and had branches throughout the world. In October
1966, a liquidity crisis arose when deposits were shifted from Beirut to London. A run on the bank developed in Lebanon, and the
banking authorities decided not to intervene. On the same day that
the Beirut office closed its doors, the New York branch was closed
by the New York Superintendent of Banks. Although initially an
examination of the books and accounts indicated that the excess of
assets over liabilities required by New York law (108% rule) 1.6 had
been maintained, it was subsequently discovered that over $21 million in standby credits, which did not appear on the balance sheet,
were in fact contingent liabilities of the branch. If these contingent
claims had been honored, the branch would have been found to be
in violation of the New York law. Initially the New York Superintendent of Banks rejected these claims. Fortunately, an unlisted
asset was discovered in the form of the branch's office building,
and the proceeds of its sale contributed to a compromise with the
creditors.'

17

The use of New York law, which was a controlling factor in the
claims arising out of the Intra Bank branch closure, is one approach to assure local depositors and creditors of a branch of a
115See Harfield, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate, 94

BANKING L.J. 293 (1977);

Katzkee, The Standby Letter of CreditDebate-The Casefor CongressionalResolution, 92
BANKING L.J. 697 (1975).
" N.Y. BANKING LAW § 202-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982). The provision required at the

time of the Intra Bank affair that the assets held in New York be not less than 108% of the
liabilities of the branch:
Each foreign banking corporation shall hold in this state currency, bonds, notes,
debentures, drafts, bills of exchange or other evidences of indebtedness or other
obligations payable in the United States or in United States funds or, with the
prior approval of the superintendent, in funds freely convertible into United
States funds, in an amount which shall be not less than one hundred eight per
centum of the aggregate amount of liabilities of such foreign banking corporation
payable at or through its branch or branches in this state, including acceptances,
but excluding (1) accrued expenses, and (2) amounts due and other liabilities to
other offices or branches of, and wholly owned (except for a nominal number of
directors' shares) subsidiaries of, such foreign banking corporation.

Id.
11 See Intra Bank v. Willie, 296 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1968), aff'd mem., 25 N.Y.2d 619, 306
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 910 (1970). See also Verkuil, Bank Solvency and
Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REv. 716, 729 (1973).
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foreign bank that, in the event of the insolvency of the latter, sufficient assets will be available to cover local claims against the
branch.1 1 8 This type of requirement is not common, however, and
the responsibilities both of parents for their foreign branches and
of the appropriate banking regulatory authorities of the different
jurisdictions have raised broader problems of policy. The circumstances testing these responsibilities differ. With regard to parents
of foreign branches, they tend to involve the expropriation of a foreign branch while with regard to banking regulatory authorities,
they tend to involve the failure of the parent or its foreign branch.
The Liability of Parent Banks for Obligations Incurred by
Their Foreign Branches
As a general rule of corporate responsibility, the obligations of a
branch of a corporation are considered those of the corporation.
With respect to banks, the Attorney General of the United States
stated in a 1909 opinion that:
[t]he branch banks have no separate corporate existence ....The
parent bank with its branches is one association, as contemplated
in these laws, with one set of directors and stockholders, and all
transactions are regarded as those of one corporation....
[D]epositors... in any of the branch banks have the protection
of the whole capital, surplus, and undivided profits of the mother
bank, irrespective of how it may be divided ....119
The specific question of the responsibility of a parent for foreign
branches was answered similarly in 1917 by the Counsel of the
Federal Reserve Board. The question before him was whether "[i]n
11 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 202-b(2). This act now reads, in part:
Each foreign banking corporation shall hold in this state currency, bonds, notes,
debentures, drafts, bills of exchange or other evidences of indebtedness, including
loan participation agreements or certificates, or other obligations payable in the
United States or in United States funds or, with the prior approval of the superintendent, in funds freely convertible into United States funds, or such other assets
as the superintendent shall by rule or regulation permit, in an amount which shall
bear such relationship as the banking board shall by regulation prescribe to liabilities of such foreign banking corporation payable at or through its agency, agencies,
branch or branches in this state, including acceptances, but excluding amounts
due and other liabilities to other offices, agencies or branches of, and wholly
owned (except for a nominal number of director's shares) subsidiaries of, such
foreign banking corporation and such other liabilities as the superintendent shall
determine.
Id.
27 Op. Att'y Gen. 601, 602-05 (1909).
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the event of the failure of a national bank having branches in foreign countries, would the creditors of the branches become general
creditors of the bank with which they were doing business."120 The

conclusion of the Counsel was that "creditors of a branch of a national bank [abroad] would . . . be general creditors of the parent

bank and would be permitted to prove their claims in the same
manner as local creditors.''2

This question has recently been litigated in two different forms.
In First National Bank of Boston (International)v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,'2 2 branches of First National in Cuba had issued

commercial letters of credit for the account of Cuban importers
seeking to buy foreign goods. In most cases the buyers had deposited Cuban pesos before the issuance of the credits. The letters of
credit had then been confirmed at First National's Boston office.
After shipping goods to the Cuban buyers, sellers had presented
their confirmed credits, together with the appropriate shipping
documents, to the Boston office for payment in dollars. On September 17, 1960 Cuba nationalized all of First National's Cuban
branches and placed Banco Nacional in charge. The credits
presented at First National's Boston office were paid. When Banco
Nacional failed to reimburse First National for the letter of credit
payments made in Boston, plaintiff brought suit claiming that the
Cuban branches had been liable to First National on the letters of
credit and that as a result of the nationalization Banco Nacional
had assumed all liabilities of the branches. 28 The court of appeals
found for Banco Nacional. The court reasoned that First National
and its Cuban branches were not distinct entities but were part of
the same parent corporation and as such any obligations owed to
each other were merely a matter of internal bookkeeping, not mat4
ters of substance.'1

In Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,1"8 plaintiffs
included several Vietnamese corporations that maintained piastre
demand deposit accounts at Chase's Saigon branch in 1975. In addition, one individual plaintiff, a Vietnamese citizen, had purchased a certificate of deposit from Chase's Saigon branch in 1974.
'20

See Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign

Branches, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 903, 924 (1979).
111 Id.
658 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1979).
"2

Id. at 899.
at 900-01.

124 Id.

-25 660

F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
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On April 24, 1975 Chase closed its Saigon branch without prior
notice to depositors. Thereafter, a new government took control of
Saigon and issued a communique announcing that all banks would
be confiscated and managed by the revolutionary administration.
When plaintiffs sought recovery from Chase's New York office of
the dollar value of the piastre deposits held by the Saigon branch
for them at the time of its closure and of the dollar value of the
certificate of deposit, Chase refused payment. Chase argued that
the seizure of its former branch in Saigon and the appropriation of
its assets relieved it of any liability to the plaintiffs.12 6 The court of
appeals reversed the lower court's decision which had been rendered in favor of Chase and remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with its opinion. The court stated that in order for
Chase to prevail it must show that the Vietnamese Government
more than merely confiscated the corporate assets. It must also
show that the government formally assumed the assets and liabilities of the corporation. 127 The court concluded that the seizure involved only the physical assets of Chase in Vietnam and did not
extend to any claims the plaintiffs may have.1 28 In support of this
conclusion, the court noted that Chase had already abandoned its
Vietnamese branch at the time of the communique and that it
1 29
could not have had any effect on the debt to plaintiffs.
The question of whether a decision in favor of a depositor might
require a parent bank of a nationalized branch to meet the latter's
liabilities at a time when its assets had been seized was the subject
of judicial comment in Esther G.M. Perez v. Chase Manhattan
Bank.1" 0 In that case the plaintiff in 1958 had obtained five certificates of deposit from the defendant bank's branch in Havana. In
September 1959 the new Cuban Government of Fidel Castro ordered Chase to close certain frozen accounts, including those of the
plaintiff, and to pay the proceeds to the government. Subsequently, the branch was nationalized, its assets confiscated, and
the liabilities assumed by the government. The branch was thereafter placed under the operation of Banco Nacional de Cuba. In
1974, the plaintiff, who had by this time emigrated from Cuba, demanded payment on the certificates of deposit of Chase in New

"' Id. at 857.
"2

Id. at 861.

128

Id.

129 Id. at 862.
1- 93 A.D.2d 402 (1983).
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York. Chase refused to make payment, contending that the obligations were solely of the branch and that the Cuban Government
had both seized the branch's assets and acquired its liabilities. " "
The trial court granted judgment for the defendant " ' as a matter
of law, and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, unanimously reversed judgment and directed it in favor
of the plaintiff. In the course of its decision, the court found the
Act of State doctrine inapplicable to the situation at hand.' As to
the argument that Chase would, in effect, be paying twice, the
court stated that a failure to rule for the plaintiff would actually
prove to be a windfall for banks in Chase's position. The court reasoned that since funds collected from one branch of a bank are
often loaned out and invested, the loss from a seizure and confiscation is far from one hundred percent. The result of Chase's position, therefore, would be to free the bank of all liability in the
country in question while only a portion of its assets had been
lost.,,"
It should be noted that this case goes beyond Vishipco insofar as
the court in Vishipco relied on a showing only that the Vietnamese
Government had confiscated the assets of the branch without also
assuming its liabilities. " In Perez, however, the court found that
the Cuban Government not only had seized the branch's assets,
but also had acquired its liabilities.'I' This finding did not, however, deflect the court from awarding judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the bank in whose branch the deposit had
been made.
While the courts were adjudicating the responsibility of parent
banks for the obligations of their foreign branches, banking supervisory authorities in a number of countries have been seeking to
work out guidelines to cover the authorities' responsibilities where
banks operate in different countries.

131

Id. at 402-04.

I /d.
18

Esther G.M. Perez v. Manhattan Bank, 93 A.D.2d 402, 463 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1983). The

United States Supreme Court defined the Act of State doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of another done within its own territory." Id. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). Congress sought to modify the application of the doctrine in the Hickenlooper Amendment, which has been codified in 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1981).
463 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
1
See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
1
See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
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The Responsibility of the Banking Regulatory Authorities
Where Banks Operate in Different Countries
The Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (Cooke Committee)8 7 was established by the Central Bank
Governors of the Group of Ten Countries in 1974 following a series
of bank failures.13 8 It was formed to facilitate cooperation and contact among the banking supervisors of the various nations. In the
course of its work it has attempted to set out a division of supervisory responsibility with respect to banks operating abroad. This
division has come to be known as the Concordat.3 9 Banking supervisors of various authorities examined the Concordat in London in
1979 and in Basle in 1980. Although no formal decisions were
taken and although the Concordat has no binding legal obligation,
the various authorities were able to express general acceptance of
its principles.
It should be noted that neither in its initial nor in its revised
version does the Concordat seek to establish which authority
should be the lender of last resort in the various situations that
may be encounterd. 14 0 As initially agreed, however, it did attempt
to suggest guidelines and recommendations on the following
matters:
(1) foreign banking supervision should be the joint responsibility
of both the authorities in the parent country and those in the host
country;
(2) all foreign banking establishments should be supervised in a
manner judged adequate by both host and parent authorities;
(3) the supervision of liquidity should be primarily the responsibility of the host authorities;
(4) the supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be essentially the responsibility of the parent authorities. For foreign
subsidiaries, primary responsibility should rest with the host authorities, but parent authorities should take account of the exposure of their domestic banks' foreign subsidiaries and joint
ventures;
187 This Committee is named for its chairman, Mr. Peter Cooke of the Banking Supervision Division of the Bank of England.
'" See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
131 Supervision of Banks' Foreign Investment, INTERNATIONAL CAMrrAL MARKErs, Aug.
1981, at 29 [hereinafter cited as Concordat].
4 Id. at 29-32; Principles of Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, INTSRNA-

TIonA

C~rrAL MARKETS, July 1983, at 49 [hereinafter cited as Revised Concordat].
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(5) cooperation may be enhanced by transfers of information between host and parent authorities and by the authorization of examinations conducted by or on behalf of parent authorities in the
jurisdiction of the host authorities.141
Additional recommendations were made beginning in 1978 to
embody the principle that international banking business should
be supervised on a consolidated basis. This principle relates capital
adequacy and risk exposure to the entire business of a bank including its branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates overseas so that the
parent authorities can evaluate these factors in a global perspective. A number of countries have revised their supervisory practices in accord with this principle. Moreover, a directive requiring
members of the European Community to bring their regulations
and procedures into accord with supervision on a consolidated basis was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Community on
June 13, 1983.141
One bank crisis has tested the Concordat. As early as 1978, the
Bank of Italy was concerned with the affairs of the Milan-based
Banco Ambrosiano. In that year its investigators submitted a report concerning the bank's foreign subsidiaries and the dealing in
the bank's shares by its president, Roberto Calvi. Mr. Calvi was
subsequently tried for currency offenses in 1981. By the middle of
1982, Mr. Calvi had fled the country and was found dead in
London under mysterious circumstances. Banco Ambrosiano collapsed and was closed by the authorities; it was subsequently reorganized with full protection for depositors. A controversy centered
about Banco Ambrosiano's Luxembourg subsidiary, Banco Ambrosiano Holdings. 48
At the time of the parent's failure, the Luxembourg subsidiary
was indebted to third parties, largely international banks, in excess
of $400 million. While some of its creditors expected the Bank of
Italy to assume responsibility for these debts, the Bank of Italy
steadfastly refused to do so. The position of the Bank of Italy was
that the Concordat sets out a division of responsibilities concerning control and supervision but does not purport to assign lender
14

Concordat, supra note 139, at 29-32; see also Frydl, The Eurodollar Conundrum, 7

FED. Rgs. BANK or N.Y.Q. REv. 11, 14 (Spring 1982) (citing Cooke, "Developments in Cooperation Among Banking Supervisory Authorities," presented at a Conference on the Internationalization of Capital Markets, March 19-21, 1981).
143 Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, INMaRNATIONAL CAPrrAL
MAIKaTs,.July 1983, at 54.

'43 The Financial Times, Nov. 17, 1982, § 3, at 2, col. 1.
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of last resort responsibilities. For their part, the Luxembourg
banking authorities noted that the subsidiary holding company
was technically not a bank and hence was not within their supervisory responsibility. 4' Precise responsibility for the matter had

thus fallen between two stools.
With a gap of this magnitude in evidence, central bankers met in
Basle in May 1983 to approve revisions to the Concordat.1 5 In addition to incorporating the principle of consolidated supervision
into the new revision, several other changes are reflected. Of particular interest is language that is intended to address the
problems that arose out of the Banco Ambrosiano affair: "Where a
bank is the parent company of a group that contains intermediate
holding companies, the parent authority should make sure that
such holding companies and their subsidiaries are covered by adequate supervision." 4 6
The new Concordat also includes recommendations concerning
joint ventures or consortia. Supervision of both their solvency and
liquidity is primarily the responsibility of the authorities in the
country of incorporation. Specific mention is also made in the new
Concordat of foreign exchange operations and positions, superviId.
1, See World Banking Guidelines, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1983, § D, at 6, col. 6.
146 Revised Concordat, supra note 140, at 48-53. The Revised Concordat states in part:
144

gaps in supervision can arise out of structural features of international banking
groups. For example, the existence of holding companies either at the head, or in
the middle, of such groups may constitute an impediment to adequate supervision. Furthermore, particular supervisory problems may arise where such holding
companies, while not themselves banks, have substantial liabilities to the international banking system. Where holding companies are at the head of groups that
include separately incorporated banks operating in different countries, the authorities responsible for supervising those banks should endeavor to coordinate their
supervision of those banks, taking account of the overall structure of the group in
question. Where a bank is the parent company of a group that contains intermediate holding companies, the parent authorities should make sure that such holding
companies and their subsidiaries are covered by adequate supervision. Alternatively, the parent authority should not allow the parent bank to operate such intermediate holding companies.Where groups contain both banks and non-bank organizations, there should, where possible, be liaison between the banking
supervisory authorities and any authorities which have responsibilities for supervising these non-banking organizations, particularly where the non-banking activities are of a financial character. Banking supervisors, in their overall supervision
of banking groups, should take account of these groups' non-banking activities;
and if these activities cannot be adequately supervised, banking supervisory
should aim at minimizing the risks to the banking business from the non-banking
activities of such groups.
Id. at 51.
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sion of which is 47
stated to be a joint responsibility of parent and
1
host authorities.
V.

THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE VIII SECTION 2(B) OF THE

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Background of the Provision
Article VIII section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (Fund Agreement) has been the subject of continuing comment both by legal writers 4 ' and by many

courts throughout the world. This article provides:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of
that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member. In
addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures
for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either member more effective, provided that such measures and
regulations are consistent with this Agreement.'"
Before the Fund Agreement took effect, there was reluctance by
the courts of one country to apply the foreign exchange controls of
another country. This was the case even though the controls might
be found to be part of the governing law according to the private
international law of the forum. Sometimes exchange controls were
referred to as "revenue," "penal," or simply against the public policy of the forum. Although the rationale differed, the result was
often the same: disregard by the forum of the exchange controls of
other nations.1 50
147 Id. at 50-52.
'" For an analysis of this subject, reference should be made to the writings of the former
General Counsel of the Fund, Sir Joseph Gold. See, e.g., J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREMENr IN
THE COURTS (1962 and Supplements); J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND
PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (1965); J. GOLD, THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES AND THE ARTCLES OF THE FUND (1966).
"I Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944 (amended
effective July 28, 1969), art. VIII, § 2(b).
ISOF. MANN, THE LEGAL AspEcTs OF MONEY (4th ed. 1982).
It has frequently been said that the private international law of exchange control
is, or ought to be, dominated by the principle that exchange control regulations
are incapable of international recognition. Although other alleged doctrines such
as the public law character or the 'territorialit6' of monetary law have been invoked in support of this solution, primarily and in essence it is public policy that
is said to require it.
Id. at 401-02.
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One of the stated purposes of the Fund in article I of the Fund
Agreement is to assist in the termination of restrictions in foreign
exchange regulations which impair international trade.16 1 The
Agreement, however, also recognizes that it might be necessary for
a member to retain or impose exchange controls for a time after
that member joined the Fund and even thereafter during intervals
of stress.152 This is the rationale of article VIII section 2(b).
In order to clarify certain complexities of the provision, the
Fund's Board of Executive Directors issued an interpretation on
June 10, 1949.153 This interpretation sets out the principle that if
the exchange controls of a member country are consistent with the
Fund Agreement, then exchange contracts involving the currency
of that member contrary to its controls should be unenforceable in
the courts and administrative bodies of all Fund members. 1 " This
interpretation noted that the affected contracts should "be treated
as unenforceable notwithstanding that under the private international law of the forum, the law under which the foreign exchange
control regulations are maintained or imposed is not the law which
governs the exchange contract or its performance." 155 Accordingly,
the provision establishes a rule which requires recognition of the
exchange control of a member country whose currency is involved
whether or not the law of such member country is the governing
law in accordance with the conflict of laws rules of the forum. 1 "
On the other hand, article VIII section 2(b) does not abrogate the
choice of laws rules of member countries. The provision merely declares that a contract is unenforceable if it is contrary to regulations which are consistent with the Fund Agreement. " It does not
require enforceability of contracts if the regulations are inconsistent. Accordingly, a member country may apply the foreign exchange controls of another member, as a consequence of the forum's conflict of laws, even though this result is not required by
article VIII section 2(b) because the conditions of the latter are not
fulfilled.
Article VIII section 2(b) does not require the courts and admin5 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 149, art. I.
152Id. art. VIII, § 2(b).
International Monetary Fund, Doc. No. 446-4 (June 10, 1949).
1I4

Id.
Id.

15

Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 149, art. VIII, §

2(b).
157

Id.
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istrative bodies of a Fund member to treat contracts as unenforceable which violate the exchange controls of nonmember countries.
It follows as a corollary that the benefits of article VIII section 2(b)
no longer are available to a country once it withdraws from the
Fund, even with respect to contracts made when the country enjoyed membership. 5 8 Furthermore, if an exchange contract was
originally contrary to the exchange control regulations at the time
entered into, but subsequently the regulations are changed so that
the contract is not contrary to them at the time of suit, the contract is not unenforceable as a consequence of article VIII section
2(b). By the same token, a contract not contrary to exchange regulations when made may become unenforceable by virtue of the
modification or introduction of exchange regulations prior to the
time of suit. In a similar manner, changes in the consistency of the
exchange regulations with the Fund Agreement may affect the enforceability of a contract. The question of enforceability may depend on changes in the circumstances of the contracting parties.
Thus exchange regulations may cease to apply to a party who was
a resident of the member country maintaining the regulations at
the inception of the contract but who changes his residence thereafter. In such a case, a contract originally unenforceable by virtue
of article VIII section 2(b) would no longer be unenforceable. Conversely, the change of status of a party from nonresident to resident of a member country may require that a contract originally
enforceable be unenforceable.
The Definition of "Exchange Contract"
One important condition for recognizing the foreign exchange
controls of another Fund member is that the member's currency be
"involved.

' 159

Despite varying court interpretations, it has been

contended that the better meaning of this word is that "[tihe currency 'involved' is the currency of the member in which there is an
effect on the balance of payments or on exchange resources."1 0
Equally crucial to recognizing the foreign exchange controls of a
Fund member is the definition of "exchange contract." Sir Joseph
Gold has noted that five basic types of economic transaction have
been distinguished:
1I8 /d.
159

See

1I0 /d

J. GOLD,

THE FUND AGREEMENTS IN THE CouR---X

483-84 (1972).
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(a) purchases and sales of goods or services against financial
items (the exchange of goods or services for means of payment);
(b) barter (the exchange of goods or services for goods or
services);
(c) the exchange of means of payment for other means of
payment;
(d) the provision or acquisition of goods or services without requital (e.g., grants-in-kind);
(e) the provision or acquisition of the means of payment without requital (e.g., gifts).
Transactions in any of these categories may enter into the balance
of payments or affect the exchange resources of a country. They
can affect exchange resources because they represent an addition
to or diminution of the assets or liabilities of a country in the sense
that ultimately they could increase, reduce, or forgo an increase in
the reserves of the monetary authorities of a country. Therefore,
"exchange contracts" are not restricted to category (c) above."'
While the highest tribunals in France and the Federal Republic
of Germany have adopted the view that "exchange contracts are
contracts that affect a member's exchange resources . . .,,,"n2 two
recent cases in the courts of New York and the United Kingdom
have taken a more restrictive view of the concept.
In J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd.,1 3 an
Israeli corporation deposited with Grindlays Bank in Uganda local
currency to establish a fund upon which plaintiff Zeevi, an Israeli
partnership, could draw. Grindlays Bank then issued an irrevocable letter of credit for the same value in United States dollars to be
available against clean drafts. The drafts were to be sent to Grindlays Bank in Uganda, and payment would be made in New York
by the debit of its account with First National City Bank upon
advice from Grindlays Bank that the terms of the credit had been
observed. Shortly after the credit was opened, the Bank of Uganda,
acting under the authority of the Minister of Finance, notified
Grindlays Bank that foreign exchange allocations in favor of Israeli
companies should be cancelled. Grindlays Bank thereupon directed
First National City Bank to refuse payment under the credit.
When the drafts were presented, they were returned unpaid to the

161 Id.
1o2Id.

'- 37 N.Y.2d 220, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975).
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presenting bank.'" The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision in favor of the plaintiffs. In the course of its decision, the
court decided that New York law (rather than that of Uganda)
should apply since that jurisdiction had the greatest interest in the
litigation and since the contacts that define its interests related to
the purpose of the law." 5 Although the letter of credit had become
unenforceable as a result of subsequent governmental action in
Uganda, such action had no effect in New York. The court then
rejected the broad interpretation of "exchange contracts" and excluded the letter of credit from the scope of the definition.' 6
Another case involving the meaning of "exchange contract" was
decided by the English Court of Appeal in United City Merchants
67
Like the Zeevi
(Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada.1
case, United City Merchants concerned the circumstances surrounding a letter of credit.'" In United City Merchants an English
company (Glass Fibres) agreed to sell equipment to manufacture
glass fibre to a Peruvian company (Vitro). As a part of the deal,
Id. at 225.
, Id. at 227. The court stated:

164

New York has an overriding and paramount interest in the outcome of this litigation. It is a financial capital of the world, serving as an international clearinghouse
and market place for a plethora of international transactions, such as to be so
recognized by our decisional law .... A vast amount of international letter of
credit business is customarily handled by certain New York banks whose facilities
and foreign connections are particularly adaptable to this field of operation....
The parties, by listing United States dollars as the form of payment, impliedly
accepted these facts and set up procedures to implement their trust in our
policies.
Id.
Id. at 228. The court stated:
Defendant urges that enforcement of the letter of credit contract would violate the
foreign exchange laws of Uganda in disregard of a treaty. Uganda and the United
States are signatories to the Bretton Woods Agreement . . . which, in relevant
part under Article VIII (§2, subd. [b]), provides: "Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control
regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." Contrary to defendants' position, the agreement, even when read in its broadest sense, fails to bring
the letter of credit within its scope, since said letter of credit is not an exchange
contract. In Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 375-76,
239 N.Y.W.2d 872, 874, 190 N.E.2d 235, 236, this court frowned on an interpretation of said provisions of the Bretton Woods Agreement which "sweeps in all contracts affecting any members' exchange resources" as doing considerable violence
to the text of the section.
Id.
168

[19811 3 W.L.R. 242.
See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
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Glass Fibres agreed to double the real purchase price so that Vitro
might obtain from the Peruvian authorities additional foreign exchange. The excess foreign exchange, once received in London, was
to be siphoned off and deposited to a Miami account of the director of Vitro contrary to Peruvian exchange control regulations.
Payment was to be made under a commercial letter of credit issued
by a Peruvian bank (Banco Continental) and confirmed by the defendant bank (Royal Bank of Canada) in London. The equipment
was shipped but, unknown to the manufacturer, Glass Fibres, it
was shipped a day later than was specified in the letter of credit.
To cover for this later shipment, loading brokers had fraudulently
entered the earlier date and related information on the bill of lading that was required to be presented for payment under the letter
of credit. Although the bill of lading thus conformed on its face to
the terms of the credit, the fact that it was false as a result of the
fraud of the brokers became known to Royal Bank of Canada.
When the documents were presented for payment under the credit,
Royal Bank of Canada refused to honor them, and suit was
brought by the assignee of Glass Fibres on the letter of credit.'"
The Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of the lower court,
ruled in favor of the defendant, Royal Bank of Canada. Despite
the strict general rule that payment must be made under a letter
of credit when the documents presented are in order on their face,
all three members of the Court agreed that Royal Bank of Canada
was entitled to refuse payment since it knew of the fraud in the
bill of lading.1 70 One member of the Court reasoned that the exception to the duty to pay under a letter of credit made in the case of
fraud is due in part to the fact that banks must rely on the shipping documents as collateral security for their advances and that it
17
is vital that such documents not be worthless. '
Another defense that had been offered by Royal Bank of Canada
was that the application of article VIII section 2(b) of the Fund's
Articles of Agreement would prevent recovery by the plaintiff in its
suit on the letter of credit. In considering this defense, however,

the members of the Court concluded that the letter of credit contract was not an "exchange contract." It merely required the pay"' [1981] 3 W.L.R. at 247.
17

Id. at 243.

"' Id. at 277. Judge Acker stated that "[i]f the bank knows that a bill of lading has been
fraudulently completed by a third party, it must treat that as a nonconforming document in
the same way as if it knew that the seller was party to the fraud." Id.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 13:621

ment of dollars against the stipulated documents. This did not fall
within the narrow definition of an "exchange contract" as an
agreement to exchange one currency for another.172 Recognizing
the autonomy of the letter of credit from the underlying sales contract which the exigencies of international trade have demanded,
the members of the Court nevertheless concluded that they had to
look at the whole arrangement. 17s Focusing on the sales contract,
the Court viewed it as concealing an exchange contract. 17 4 But for
the effect of the fraud on the letter of credit, Griffiths, L.J., would
have given judgment in the suit on the credit for the cost of the
machinery and freight but refused judgment for the excess dollars
bound for Miami. In any event, the members of the Court agreed
that if the suit had been brought on the contract of sale instead of
the letter of credit, the plaintiff might have recovered that part of
the transaction which represented the genuine price of the equipment sold even though the application of article VIII section 2(b)
would have barred recovery of the amount that represented a mon17
etary transaction in disguise.

"7 Id. at 251. Stephenson, L.J., said that "[ilf the letter of credit contract between Glass
Fibres and the defendants is considered in isolation, it is a contract to pay dollars against
documents. It contains no agreement to exchange one currency for another. And that is
what an 'exchange contract' is." Id.
Griffiths, L.J., expressly agreed that, viewed in isolation from the contract of sale between
Vitro and Glass Fibres, the letter of credit was not an exchange contract. "If it is right to
look at the letter of credit in isolation from the matrix of the arrangement in which it operated, I accept that it is not an exchange contract for it did not involve Peruvian currency
but was concerned solely with dollars." Id. at 279.
I"'Id. at 280. In the words of Griffiths, L.J., "[u]nless constrained by authority to do
otherwise the court, in my view, ought to look at the whole arrangement and if it sees that
the sale contract disguises an exchange contract it should refuse to enforce it through the
medium of the letter of credit." Id.
" Id. at 251-52. Stephenson, L.J., continued:
True it is that the first contract between Glass Fibres and Vitro is a contract of
sale and purchase of goods, but that contract itself contains two terms which betray the wolf of an unenforceable exchange contract in the sheep's clothing of an
enforceable sale contract: the doubling of the genuine purchase price and the payment of half the doubled price to Nanke in the United States of America. These
terms, the overpayment and the disposition of the surplus, are contrary to the
exchange control regulations of Peru, and those regulations are admittedly maintained or imposed consistently with the Bretton Woods Agreement. Those terms
therefore make the sale agreement a monetary transaction in disguise, at least in
part.
Id.
17 Thus, Ackner, J., said:
The monetary transaction in disguise being clearly identifiable, I can see no problem in the court refusing to enforce the merchandise contract to the extent that it
was an exchange contract. Accordingly, if the plaintiffs had sued upon the mer-
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CONCLUSION

This Article demonstrates how jealously the letter of credit obligation has been guarded over the years in the courts so as to protect international trade. The parties to letters of credit rely on
their knowledge that the banks must make payments under them
in accordance with their terms. The banks must not be concerned
with the underlying transactions, but only with the credits themselves. An exception to the rigidity of the rules is recognized, but it
has been limited as in Sztejn to cases of fraud. The fraud must be
palpable and not merely a vague allegation as in American Bell,
although the exact boundaries have not yet been delimited as is
shown by the Itek litigation. Trendtex, Texas Trading, and the
related cases show that failure to carry out obligations under a letter of credit will lead to liability even for governments and their
central banks. Despite their possible implication in certain bank
failures such as that of United States National Bank in San Diego,
letters of credit and the financial obligations incurred under them
will be protected in the courts. As far as possible, the letter of
credit mechanism is also to be preserved from the vagaries of international conflicts. As evidenced by First National Bank of Boston,
the expropriation of foreign branches and the consequent inability
of a parent bank to recover amounts paid under letters of credit
may occasion financial loss but will not interfere with the efficacy
of the instrument.
Will the protection of the letter of credit given by the courts go
so far as to exclude them, by way of interpretation, even from the
provisions of an international agreement? Not only has this question arisen in the context of Itek and the other Iranian-United
States cases where it awaits a decision of the Claims Tribunal, it
has arisen in Zeevi and United City Merchants in a completely
different context.
Both Zeevi and United City Merchants illustrate the difficult
problems the courts face in reconciling the demands of international trade with obligations undertaken in accordance with an international agreement. In both cases, the courts expressly recognized the immense importance of protecting a mechanism the
purpose of which is to assure payment in commerce between the
chandise contract, they would have been entitled to recover so much of the true
and genuine price of the goods as was then due and owing.
Id. at 272.
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nations. In both cases the courts took a restrictive view of the definition of an exchange contract and in so doing, by judicial interpretation, excluded the letter of credit from the definition thus
adopted. In Zeevi the court concluded its deliberations once it was
able to exclude the letter of credit from the definition. By so doing,
it excluded the letter of credit from an obligation undertaken in
accordance with an international agreement. In United City
Merchants, however, through obiter dicta the Court may have
foreshadowed a further development in the balance that has thus
far been effected between the competing considerations. In the
words of Stephenson, L.J.:
International trade requires the enforcement of letters of credit
but international comity requires the enforcement of the Bretton
Woods Agreement.
I do not see why a court should shut its eyes to the object of
the contract and with its eyes shut fall over backwards to avoid
complying with the demands of international comity. On the contrary, the courts of this country should incline the other way and
do their best to prevent breaches of the Bretton Woods Agreement to which this country is a party. .... 17

'7* Id. at 258.

